USE OF FORCE

POWER THROUGH CLARITY: HOW CLARIFYING
THE OLD STATE-BASED LAVVS CAN REVEAL
TH F STRATF.CTC POWF.R OF tAvV

J\tl!CHAEL BAHI\R1.

lNTI\ODLTCTIOI\:

9/11,

More th.:u1 seven ye<�rs after the attacks of

it is perhaps

difficult to remember the terrible confusion of the inunediate

aftermath.

As l sit dovvn to write this Article in a Pentagon office

damaged by Americcm ALrlines Glight 77, I can

only imagine how

1nuch these softly humming computers, neatly o rga nized binders,

and moduJar walls bclje lhe horrible reaLity of that
According to

•

a

fall morning.
u

former Deputy Attorney General of the Office of

Legal Counsel ("OLC"), the document that legally "set the tone for
all that was to come" in the so-called Wm· o n Terror was penned
am.idst tl1at catastrophic contusion, a were two weeks after the
attacks.l

While "burdened

wi.th dozens of other emergency

duties," a prominent acc�demic who possessed an expansive view
of prcsidl'ntial power quickly dr,1fted an OLC memo entitled, "The
President's

Constitution,•!

Authority

to

Condllcl

Mi litnry

Micb,wl 6Clhflr is ,1 l.i�uten.mt in tilt' U.S. Navy jlllige Advocatt> Gener.1!'::.
(" JAG ) C>r�1 MKI an ,1djunct pr(1fcs�or ill NYU's \Vilf Fe1mily Department of
Politics. He h<1s Jn LL.M, from G1lumbi<1 University School of Law, a J.D. from
f L:lrvard Law School, and <111 M . Ph U in lnkrnJtional Relations from Cambrid�co
·

"

Universitv. H� h<�� been

on ,Ktive dutv
since June :2003. He would like to tha1;k
.
1-l;otm,lh J�obens illld his i,unih·, as IVc ll J:S Patrie"- M. Walsh, Bruce Mo:JcDun.dd,
Ji'lm·=� w Hnth,:k, f;'rln r: Sinn� ;md r'\nrwtto• r•igntt. ThP viPWS expreso:;ed in lhi�
Paper ,ue tlw Autl·wr'<. own. They du not necess.uily r�present the view<.; uf the
Depa r lment (1f [k•fc:nsc, the united SlCltcs t'-:,wy, or MtV of its components.

' ]ALl< GoLD<:.;-..Im 1. THE !"ERROR
BusH AOivllt\IS'l!\.-\ 110� tl7-98 (2007).
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Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them."2
Th.is memo, coupled with his i deological alignment with those in
the Administrcllion devoted
suddenly

gained

hirn

to

strong or u nitary executive,

�

entry

into

the

exclusive

and

highly

influential War Council. Together with the ·white House Counsel,
the Vice President's Cou nsel, and the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, h e plotted the legal str�tcgy in the war o n
terrorism, drafting '' opinion and opinion Clppro\'i n g every aspect o f
the administre1tion's aggressive antiterrorism efforts.''3
But these memos, drafted in extraord in0ry limes and under
great pressure, proved significantly flawed as emergency ceded to

the nev·l normalcy of the post-9 /11 world. While some of these key
memos have been

revised, and

many have been

completely

withdrawn,-1 some of the basic views on the legal status o f terrorists
a n d other non-state <1ctors persist, causing great legal confusion.
In truth, the legal theories the War Council espoused to
maximize presidential power actually concealed
avenues of executive authority.

many potent

By regaining cbrity, however,

these powers can be revealed- and the key to doing so lies in
understanding the crucic1l role of the state i n the international
context. As the United States takes on the violent non-state actors,
whose arsenals now exceed those of many states, pol icymakers
and leaders should not give Ltp on those "old-fashioned" rules
designed for relations among states. Many of the legal constructs
developed over the past centuries, when properly clarified, are still
very powerful tools for defending national security, even within
what

has

been

lE:'rmed

the

Fonrlh

Generation

of

warfare.s

International law and constrtutional law empower, n o t h a m per, the
nation's efforts to defend itself and its allies, just as they have
a l ways done.

ld.

' /d. HI 23.
� Men1orandurn tron1 S'tcven G, Br�dbury,. Princ-ip;d Deputy ,�ssistant
Attorney Ccner:al, Stolu� 11( (L'rfa!l OLC Opi11it111:5 J.:;;;ucrl i11 1/Je A}il!l'llmtlt (if 1/Jc
Tarorist 1\tln<'ks uf S�J11. l1, 2UO 1 (J<�n. ·15, 2009), tn>nila/lle at
hltp:/ / www.usdoj.gov / npa/ documents/ memostalusolcopinionsO L 152009.pdf
(rescinding many memorandums issued in the wake ot the 9/11 attacks).
5 Set! genaally COlONEL THot-·IAS X;\VIER HAMMES, THE SuNG AND THE STONE:
ON WAR IN THE 21'5'1 CENTURY (2004) (discussing the evolved nature and
characteristics of Fourth Generation warfare).
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In a companion article, I

argued that \•Ve cannot vvage wm
non-state actors, no rn atter lhow virulent tht=>y n•ay be6
"War" and "the enemy" connote definitive legal c ate gor ies from
the framing of the Const itu tion to the present which, if expa nde d
beyond their o rigin al state-based undt:!rstanding, S\lvallow essential
pillars of the remaining constitutional structure, render much of
the existing law of war inconsistent, and make military objectives
more strategically difficult to attain.' However, in a brief note, I
argued that we can nonetheless use military force to c o u nter these
violent n o n -state actors- and, at times, shou ld.t:
ln this Article, I expand upon that note and attempt to clarify
and frame the most important legal i: ssues affecting the planning
and e x e cution of operations against nonsta te actors in the coming

against

decades.

This Article should dernonstrate that while we cannot

non-state acto rs, the U.S. Constit u tion and
international law, when properly clarified, vigorously support
forcefully engaging non-state actors vvho: (a) take a direct part in
h ostilities; (b) commit violent attacks outside the jurisdiction of any
state; or (c) engage in action sufficiently hostile to warrant
intmediate measures in individual or u nit self-defense.
While individual articles can expound on each of these points
in great detail, this Article seeks instead to provide the overarching
international and constitutional framework, and to make the point
that embracing the law, instead of fighti ng against it, reveals the
law's true pow er. Force will not solve many of the great security
challenges on its own- for national security must be a national
exertion, as international security must be a global one- but, there
is great cause to hope that in the next decades, a renewed embrace
of the international and constitutiona1 law of war will fully reveal
the empowering abilities of both and the law's ability to enhance
the security of all.
wage war against

2.

CROSSING BO.RDERS: THE [US AD BHLWvi .REQUIREMENTS
Over the past eight years,

legally vvaged against

trying to argue that war cannot be
non-state actors con sist ently met with fierce

Sec Michael Bahar, As Necessity Crcntc� t/1<· Rule: Eisentrager, Boumedienc
Tile Enc111y- Haw Stmtcgic Rcnlitics Clll Ctl11Siitutiolit7lly Require Grcnfer Rig/its
far Octninces in ilu: Wars of the TzPcnty-Fir�t Ce11111ry, '11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277
1>

1111d

(2009).
7

/d. Cit 209-303.

s

ld. Cit 301.
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resistance in certain defense and

natiomd sec uritv circles. To those
vvho believe lha t war can be declared against non-state actors/1 I
would a5;k:
Since the 9/11 hijackers plc1 nncd their atte1cks in
Germany, vvnuld it be legal for the Unil�d States to 'ivage vvar
against t.h0m b\'1 say, launching cruise missiles ,,gJinst rem Z� ining
a! Q<1cda terrorist cells in Hamburg without Germcm co ns en t or
without

evidence

that

Germany

harbored

or

supportL�d

the

hijackers?'

going after those dangerous individuals is
Lhc U.N.
Charter prohibits the nonconscnsual use <.." f force c1gainst (or
within) another ::.late except in self-defense, would it be legal for
the United States to invade an y cmmtn· in which " suspected
Put anlotb�r \Nay:

one thing;, but since warfare involves kinetic strike�, �H1d

terrorist resides, even if the state itself

vvas

cluing everything

iL

could to thwurt tenorism?

To those
ask:

who answer that

fact, be legnl, I vvnuld
German::;; to l.:nmch a cruis e
Miami if they had actionable intelligence that e�
plotting an attack against Ge nnan y in the middle
it

would, in

but would it be legal for the

missile irnto
terrorist wos

floor of a high-rise, waterfront condominium?
For the thoughtful, the response often is: well, there !llliSt

be

C\

wc:1y for the United Slates to defend itself militarily. And there is.

But oiten the ideological and

the

intransigent cut off

with their respo.nse: 11WelL let 'em

the

d_iscussion

try."

Unfortunately, such a brawny response just shijts the question
from the legal to the power-political.

But as Lhe past eight yeors

have shown, those who pounded the neoconservative table and
sought to declare "law and force as antonyms"11i are painfully
wrong.11

'1

See

Attornev

Hopefully the next years will

e.g.

demonstrate

that law

and

iV!l!morandum

Ceneral,

to

from John C. You, Dq'Llt)' /\ssisl<�nt
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 2--1

(Oct.
1\
200'1.),
uuailnNi!
at
http:// W\v\\·.u�duj.guv / upn/ document:,
/ lllt!m<1mi l ti t<�r:' forcccomba tus10232001. pdf.
Ill

Sec, J'.g,, STEPIIEi\: llOLivlt:S, rffE M.-\TAnor(:. C..\i'F: .•\;>.1U\IC..\1S RFli-:LES�

RESPONSE r<.l TEI-!I\01<

76 (2007).

NO\vhcre is the s hi ft CIWCI)' frn111 this view ,1nd l�>w :mb iht? str:1ll!gic
,1lignnwnl of I<11V <�nd force more pmnounced th.111 In tlw L·.s. Anny/M<Irine.:;
n

Counlerinsurgt>ncy Field M<1nual, publishl'd in Dcc.:mber 1006 by General D,wid
Petraeus and hi:; Marine counterpart, Lieutenant Generr1l J<�mcs Amos. The Field
�'l,lnual marked a radical shiit in policy in lmq, ,1nd C�fficially no tctl the
deleterious strategic e ffects of "illegitimate actions . .. involving the use of power
witbout a u t h o rity, " including "unlawful detention, torture, nr punish ment
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force are strategically aligned, es pecial ly in Fourth Generation
\varf<lre.
The vv<:1y the United States can defend itself milit21rily fro m non
state

actors residing in another state- holding aside Security
cnforcernent

Council

action

Chapter

under

or

VII

obtaining

diplomatic consent- is through the inherent right of individual or
c oll ectiv e

self-defense against state com plicity or

<l

fundan1.entc1l

st<lte ! nabi litv to keeo its house in order.
l

'

1.1.

Artide 51n11Ll Stnte Complicity
build

To

international

this

grealer

lcnvvers,
J

polic�'makers, and

as

cla rily
well

over
as

the

coming

constitutional

years,

lawvers,
-

judges, must accept the following fact:

the

proscription on the threat or use of force,t2 bi nding on the United

Stotes as a ratified treaty,D has 21s its primary

self-defense,14

\vh.ich only applies, and

�1ttacks by other states or their equivalent.

Of

exce p tion

the righ t of

cnn only apply, to armed

course, the p lain language of Article

51

to the U.N. Charte r

does not expressly limit self-defense to responses to armed attack
by states.15

Adm i ttedly, while Article

2(4)

explicitly states that oll

members "shall refrain .in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
ind e pen d ence

of any state," 16

Art icl e

51

has

no such

textual

!imitC1tion on the source of the armed 21ttackY In fact, tl1e language

without
tri a l."
U.S.
ARi\IY-:\IL\RiNE CORPS,
FIF.LD MANU:\L, -12-43,
O..IV\Tm r ,:s u RG EN C Y, ,i 1-132 (University of Chicago P re ss 2006).
�� C.\J. Charter art . 2, para. -1 ("All members shall rdr<1in in their
intern<�tional rel<1tions from the thre<�t or use of force against the territorial
intcgrit�· or political i ndependence of an y state, or in any other m<wtner
inconsist�nt with the Purposes of the United Na tions.").
u Sec t...:.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ( pr ovid i ng that treaties are the supn�rnc law of
the land}.

tJ.N. C h ar ter art. 51.
I' Sec An dru [. Wi:lll, lntcmtllic.)IJn/
:.J

lhs. 193,
J,

202

Law and

tl1e Bus/1

Ooctri11<!,

34 ]SR. Y.B. HU:>.·I.

(2004).

U.i\!. Charter, art. 2, p<'lra.

-1

(emphasis added).

17 /d. Mt. 51 (emphasis added).
S<!c alsu Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Oc cupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
200-l !.C.J. 136, 215 (Jul)' 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) ("There is, with
respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that tlws stipulates that self-defence is
available only when an ar med attack is made by a State.").
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of Article 51 i. ni ti ::1 l l y incorporated lhe words armed. "attack hy
nuotlter state," but this wording was later droppedY'
l?urthcrmorc, the Security Council Resolution 1368, passed in
response to 9/"11, recognized "tbe inherent right

of individual or

collective self-defence .in accordance with the Charter" in the
context of intemationcll

terrorism, and legitimized the United

Stales' response in Afghunistan.1" Jn a later resolution, the Security
Council also tldopted measures to combat internCitional terrorism
under Ch<:iptl'r VII llf the U.N. Cha rter and confirmed the view
,

tl1at internati0nal t err o rism constitutes a threat to inlerni:ltioncll

pee�ce and security.���
But inlenh1t[onll1 1Jw is still primarily formed by, and bRscd
a5 conflict between therlv:!l

upon stales, e1nd vvetr is still defined

The international legal community has consistently r ejecte d the
possibili ty th<t t sl11tcs could use the self-defense exception Lo i nkr
state use of force fur purely non-state actors.

In the late 1980s, the U.N. denied that Article 51 could justify
the use o£ force nr the right of self-defense as a response to terrorist
attacks such as the bombing of Tripoli and Bengosi (1986) and the
bombing of the Palestine Liberation Orgonizntion offices in Tunisia
by Israel (1985 and 1988).22

J,, Daphne Richemlmd, Tmlt51tlltiunal Tarurisl Organi:ntion:; and tlte Usc uf
Frrce, 56 CUH. lJ. L. REV. 1001, L007 (2007)�
19

S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1368 (Sept. l2, 2001).

Sec S.C. Res. l373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1313 (Sept. 28, 2001) (resolving that ell!
stales should work tu suppress the funding of terrorism); see o/.o;v Press Release,
North ;\tlanlic Council, St<llcment by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001),
.
nuoilablc at http:/ jwwW.Ih1to.int/docu/pr/200 1 /?01-124e.h tm; Lord Robertson,
Statement by ;\JATO Sc.:crdCiry Ge nernl l.ord Robc.:rlson (Oct. ?., 2001), tiPI1ilalJ/c 111
http:/ jwww.nillP.int/docu/ speech/2001/s011 002:1. htm;
Organization
of
American Sl<lles JOASJ, Terrorist Threat to the Americas, 0 . .-\.S. Doc.
RC.24/RES.'I/o-l, OEA/scr.F/11.24, 1st plen. sess. (St>pl. 2'1, 2001), aPai/a[l/e tlt
http://wwv\'.O<l::.urg/0.'\Spugc/crisis/RC.2.:1e.htm.
"o

,

11 St•e e.g. 2 L. 0111' >JHEI�i, li\TIRNATIO;\!AI LA\\': A TREr\TlS£ 67 (Ron,,!d r
l
Ro>.burgh �:d., 3rd ed. !932) (defining w,H as a "contl.:'nli0n betvveen two or IllL'rl:
States through th0ir <1rmcd forces").

22 GiuliC�n,l Zicc,1rdi C;,p.lldt\ Prc>c1iding 11 Ri:;/11 l�( St'liDcfcnsc ;\�ai11st Lai'�c
Scrth.! AtftKks by lrrcsular Fvn:e�: Tile l:;rae/i-Tle::bo/la/t Co11jlirt, 48 f-IAIW. INT'L L.J,
ONLI:-JE 101, 104 (2007) (citing S.C. Res QS, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978);
S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985); S.C. Res. 611, U.N. D0c.
S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, l 988); G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. Doc. A/R ES/41/38 (Nov. 20,
1986)).
.
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Addilionally, in

2004,

the

In terna tional

(" IC]")2-� indicated thC\t an "mmcd
Article 51

em anates

only fro m

i'l

a ttac

k"

Court

of

Justice

within the meaning of

stntc. In its advisory opinion, Leg11l

of Constntcfic>n of �!Vall in Occupied
noted that:
Article 51 of the Charter

Coi!sequenccs

the lCJ

1301

'I

Pnlestin ian TerritOI�J,
thus recognizes the

existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed
attack

by one State against anolh�r StJle. However, Israel does not

claim that the attacks against it are im p uta bl e to a foreign State."2.J
For the Fmmers of the U.S. Constitution," war" meant what the

contemporary in te rn at ion a l theorists and philosophers meant it to
bt->.2-" l-h1go l.rntius,. Samuel von Pufendorf, E m m er ich cie VC�ttel,

Jean

Jacques

Rousseau,

c1nd

]eiln

]cKq ues

considered war a contest bctw ct�n states.

influential figure

on

Burlamaqui

all

Rousseau, a high ly

the Fram�rs, wru tc thc1t:

War is not therefore

<1

relcltionship between one man and

another, but a relationship betvvecn one stale <md another.
In war privat e individuals are enemies only jncidenlally:
not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers .... [E]ach
state can have as
n1en ....2h
But

perhaps

more

enemie�

only othe1- states and not

compelli.ng

than

parsing

international

precedent and divining original constitutional understanding is a
corrunon-sense analysis. As Jaw mt.JSt be recip r oca l1 if we can wage
W<lr

against no11slate actors located in Lhe t e rr ito ry of another state,

2.' The ICJ is "the principal judicial orge�n of the U ni te d Nations."
U.N.
ChMtcr a rt. 92. [twas estoblished i n 1945 pursu«nt to the U.N. Charter. The Jq
Statute, ilnne>.ed to the U.N. Charter, provides the organizational frameworlc and
governinb procedures for cases brought before the ICJ.
Statute of tl\e
International COLlrl of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, tWailciblc
at http:/ fwww .icj-cij.org/ dontmt>nls/ indexphp?pl=48p2=2&p3=0.
24
Legnl Consequences of the Construction ot <:1 W<�ll in Occu pi ed Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 139 (July 9) (emphasis added). The
Court also ndded a second argument to its rebuttill of Israel's pleas. The Court
noted th,1t the terrorist thre<lt invoked by fsrad originJted v\rithin, and not outside
its territ(ll'V. lhe situation was tlwrdore fmmd to be di fferent from that
"contcm pl<1ted by Security Council resolu tio ns 1368 {2001) and 1373 (2001)." /d.
TI1erd(1re Israel ''could not in any event illvOkl' lho�e rt>c;oluho!ls" 111 support of its

clc1irn

lobe exercising a right of self-defl'nst'.

ld.

51.'1.' Ch.1rl�o1s A. Loigrcn, VVar-1\ (akin:; Under tile Cunstitution: Tlu: Orixilwl
Undcrst!lluli;tg, 81 YALE LJ. 672, 689-97 (1 972) (arguing t ha t European and English
ideas c111ll philosophers shaped eighteenth century American ideas about "VC'tt) .
.25

1r,

]tA!\1-}ACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 21-22 (Donald A. Cress

eel., trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1988) (1762).
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what is to keep Germany from bom bin g nonstate actors in

Mian1.i
Beach cond os?
To be clear, to say that Article 51 only appl i es to armed attacks
by states is not to limit the victirn state from takin g mi litary action
to defend itself. Not at all. Tt just means that if the attacker is
resi din g i n the te rr itory of a nother state, Article 51 does not permit
the United States to invade that state to get at the attacker- even if
the at tack er is a viable, m ilitar y target.
Fo nner Secr etary of
HotTleland Secu rity and feder al appeals jud ge, Michael Chertoff,
argues that a state-based or "narrovv conception of sel f-defense
misses the mark."27 "As a practical mwtter," he continues:
[I]t ignores the incre asing

dange r pose d by nons ta te actors,
particularly in an age wh en they can obtain weapons of real
destructive force.
Moreover, it leaves n21tions helpless
when sn attack is threatened by a group that has created a
haven vvithin another state.28

is confusing ius in bello c onc e rns over whom to t arget29
with the ius ad bellum concerns of where to t arge t. He also does not
appreciate the wealth of inte rnati onal law that a !lows states to
defend themselves against terrorist havens wherever they may be.
The rule should be unde rs tood as follows:
countries can
invoke the self-defense exception to the general prohi bition on the
use or threat of force to tar get nonstate actors residing in another
state, so long as there is evidence that the state was som eho w
involved in th e aggressive action. Just as U.S. citizens have the
right to be secure in their pe rso ns and property unless they have
forfeited that right by breaki ng the la·w, nations too enjoy s ecu rity
from invasion unless they forfeit that right by some agg ressive
inte r-state act, eith er dir ec tly, through proxies, or thro ugh a
comp lete inabili ty to i rnpose law and order in their territories.
Accordingly, the acknovvledgm.ent within Secur i ty Council
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 that a state may claim self-defense in
response to an armed attack by a terro ris t organizati0113o should
But he

27 Mi chae l Chertoff, Tile r�e::;pon::;iWity to Ctmtniil: Protecting Soventi�llf!J under
lntematiow?l Law, FOREIGN AH., Jan./Feb. 2009, at lB.

�s !d.

Section 3 for a discussion of ius in l;e//u concerns.
S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 19 ( Recogni;:i11g th e inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter."); S.C. Res.
1373, supra note 20 ("Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or coll ect i ve self29

See inji·a

30

Sec
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not be taken too broadly.
Council's

actions

in

Nicnmgua

Rather, we need to interpret the Security

reference

the

to

United Stntes, the ICJ n o ted

v.

aggressive

Qaeda as their agents.

Afgb <l n i st a n using al

1 303

state actors could trigger a ri gh t

of

of

II

19S6

In its

by

deci:.;ion,

a t tacks by non

that armed

self-defense provided th<:1t

non-state conduct could be attributed
they 21nnounced was one

actions

to

a st<1tc.:>1

effective cnntrol.ll32

the

The stand<1rd
Even if a stdte

d oes not d i rect

the ac to rs to allt1ck another slate, so long
as that
u
state hC\d dfec t i ve control" over the nun-sta lc actors, the vit.:ti mII

sti\te's retaliation i n to the offending state's sovereign

j usti f i ed .
rhis st<� Le-nexus standard

Conga

decision in
L1u nc hcLl

The

Uganda

u.

animated the ICJ's

as

well.

more

was

recent

l n t h a t c8se, Ugc1 nda had

l i n1ited strike i n t o the DRC lo

a

terri tor�'

get

Jt

a terrorist faction.

lCJ found " that the legal und fac t u a l circumstances

exercise of

for th e
thl:.' DRC

right of self-defence by Uganda ugc:�inst

a
[Dem.ocratic

Republic

of

the

Congo J

were

not

a t tacks were

attributable

" t here

to

the

that the terrorist
the Court found that

present."33

Evaluating Uganda's argu rnents
DRC,

no

is

satisfactory proof of the involvement i n these i1t tacks, direct or
indirecl, of
emanate

the Government of the DRC. The attacks d i d not
hom armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on

behalf of the DRC .
The effective

"

. . 1'34

control

standard

is exacting.

effectively control a non-stale actor,
requires

f i na nc i ng,

"

equipping .

.

.

the

orgamzmg,

Nicaragua
trcnmng,

For
v.

s ta te

to
United States
a

supplying

and

selection of its military or para m i l i tary targets,

the

decision,

Tndic, loosened the restriction slightly <�nd

Prosecutor

pronounced

that

v.

whole of its operat ion."_;,,

The

1999

and the pl<mning of

acts performed by members of a pclnnn i l i tary

group organized by a foreign stale

may

be considered

"acts

o f de

_ti1clo State organs regardless of any specific instruction by t b e

defenc\'

ns

recClt,'l1ized by the Chartt!r t"�f the Unitt:d Nations

resolution 1 368 (200 L)

. . . . ).

·q St'l' i'vlilitary and

(Jlll<e �7)

as

rL'it�ro1ted in

''

Parami li�ary Activitit?$ (Niecn.

,._

li.S.). 1986 I.C..J. H. 30-..Jl

(discussing the internationa 1 conscnsu� on the right of self-defense).

·� ld. at 65.
l"

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dent. r�cp. Congo

Ugilnda),

2005 l.C.J,

l,

53 (Dec. 19).

31

ld,

35

Nicnragtm, 1986 I.C.J. at 64.
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controlling State concerning the corTu11 ission of each of those
acts.''36 The stc1tc does not huve to issue specific instructions for the
directiLm of e\·ery i n d L v i d u a l operation, nor docs i t have to select

b u t the non-state actor must be su bjcr:t to the

concrete tC1 rgels,

"overall control" n( t he forcLgn sta te.37
As the

ftillian professor Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo <1rgues,

" [Tjhcsc high standards st<md iJl contrast to the 197-± Rc:::C llution of
the

General

Asse m b ly,

involvt'rtlcn t."'';'

which

required

merely

'substantiEd

f\r�uing for a "less rigid" standard, Capaldo

observes th<'lt " ' dft:cti ve control' is not easy to ascertain i n LOncretc
cases,

<IS

there i�

exercised 3 u d t a
treating

n

<1

need for 'dear evidence' of

cl egre c

Stt�te having

a

of control 'i11 all fjelds' so

i'I S

to

justify

nnn-state <'lctor <ts e1cting on its behalf."\'1

l ex�'ect that

with

the U n i t�d Sta tes p laying a leading role, the

i n ternc1tional community w i l l come to a less exacting standard; but

with U.S. policy should gather a l l
before strjking non-state (ICtors in the
otherwise inviol(lb]e sovereignty of other slates. A n d as further
evidence that .i n ternati onal law a n d military strategy are often
in the meC�ntime, those charged

evid ence of st.�te complicity

a l i gned, there is no requi rement that the ev idence be relee1sed prior
to the stri ke.�l)
2.2.

Article 51 aud F'undruuentnl State lnn/Jility

W h i l e so much control can amount

to state comp licity, the

al most· complete i r m b i l i t y to control can also legitimate strikes into
a

state. Under the Co1}it

Cltnnnel case of 1949, states are required to
territory to be used for acts contrary to

"not . . . ,11low knowingly its

the 1·ights ('1f other States."41
armed bands, directed

A state's toleration of activities of

against another country,

is u n l a wfuJ.42

According lo ,, leading i n ternational law theorist, Yoram Dinstein,

,�

Pro..sccu t\!i' v. T.1dic, Ca�e No. lT-9-1-1-f\, Jud gment, ,I

.. lei. �� 1 20.

137 (July 15, lY9Y).

;)( Cdpaldo, �upm nut� 22 at 1 07.
',1} Jd.
·•11

Allhc 'llgh, ��wntLlally, o:1ll thal evidence should be relcase�ble.

H

Co rfu Ch.1n1it>l (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 7? (Apr. 9).

�� S,·c S.S. lt1tus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 9, ,1t �3 (Se p t. 7)
(tvlnor':', j., di--�t:tlling} ( " I t is well settled that Cl State is bound to u�c due diligence
to }'t'l'Vl'nt the LUntmissiun within its dominions of cri m i nJ I acts agai ns t another
nJtion or its people."; ::ec also United States Diplotnt�tic and Con�u!ar Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v . Iran), 1980 J.C.]. 3, 31-33, -!4-45 (May 24) (discussing the attack on
a U.S. Embassv by Iranian militants).
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state

thdl

"does

' v igilance/ a n d

not

fails ' i n

fulfill

its

l305
obligations

i n ternational

i ts specifi c du ty

to l t: rc1 tc

not to

of
the

d irec ted against a
or which m i g h t endanger f t the lcl tter's

preparation in its territory o f actions which are
foreign

government

security,' assmnes interncl lional responsibility for this i n tcrn<1 t i o n a l
wrongful a c t

of o.mission." ' 1

Of course, assuming international

r esponsi bi l i ty for an act o f

alw,, y s equ<d a n imputed armed c�ttnck sufficient
o ffen d i ng state's right to territor ia l sovereign!!', but
it is certe1inly a step a lo n g th.Jl path. for example, think dbOL!l
Pakistan toda y (or e x J m pl e . When Osama bin Le1den esc,1pt�d intl1
the vast, largely ungoverned Norlhw�:st Triba l Regions of [)oklst<ln,
the place was ,, PP<lrc nt l!' "so inviting that over the nex.t few �·eurs
he never s trclyed ((l r."H
AcL"o rding lo a leading a u t h o r i ty, t-Jw

omission may no t
to suspend the

seven tribal agencies that make up the area adjoining the North
West Frontier Province became the new base of operations for a l
Qaeda, from which
Islamabad, a n d

the bomb plots i n London, Madrid,

later Germany cmd

Bt1 l i ,

Denmark were plAnned.',

Pakistan's inability to c0ntrol this " terrorism centra1"1o arguably

Ctl1:fi1
Chnnnel ana lysisY parlicu lc�rly in light of the list of affirma t ivl!

opened the door to U.S. measures in self-defense under a
stale obligwtions uutlincd in U.N. Security Council
1373:18
So Michael Chertoff is correct in calling for

a

Rcsul u ti o n

responsibilitv

e1mong states to contain terrorism within their own borders:

·lJ Yor�A.\1 IJIN�I F.l�, W1\R, ACCIU..SSIUN AND SELF-DEFENCE 20(> (·lt'h l'd..
Cambrid�e Univ,�rsitv Pr�ss 2005} (1988) (citing Roberto Ago, Fourt/1 R.rpurt t•ll
Stntc Resptm:>ihility, f1972j 2 Y B. fnt'l L Comm'n 71t l20, U.:'\. o�n:.
t\jCNA/ 264//\d\L I).
ll AHMED R/\SHIIJ, DESU.i\!'1 INTO CI IA{)!;i 265 (2008).
��

/d.

46

/d.

I n tC>:; llmu nv

bdtH� the Se!n,llc Armed Services Committee, Seneldf\' 111
Robert Galt.:� �<1id thnt it w,�s "certainly'' his view that the u.l\;. Ch.iriL'r
allo;vs a n<1lion the right nt self-defense when a fl1reign govcrnmcr1t l'- L'itlwr
unublc· or unwilling lo tnkt' t.:clre of ll1ternatlP n u l terrorist activity in!>it..k its
borders. St'c Pa�d Tighe, Pah::: t llll ltV!mts U.S. illtclli,'?l'IICC to Aid Fight A:.;llill.'!
Mil i ta11 ts, BLOI)i'vl f;Er.:c, c;,�ptember :2-J., 2008, http://www. bloomberg.com/ .1pps
/news?pid=20601U9 l &sicl=azV3FI'7XKr2s&refer=indi<L
� S.C Re5. 1373, �upm r.ute 20, <1mong other things, specifies a series of slate
responsibilities to prevent the aiding or financing of terrorist activities and the usc
of state territory as terrorist bases or havens.
�7

Defen�e
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[ t is not enough for a group o f nations, such as the Security
Council,

to

pass

resolutions

Lf

supporting terrorists.
threats, there rnust be

that

prohibit

states

from

states fail to contain transnational
international legal regime that

2n1

subjects them to potential sanctions o r even, if necessary,
mil itary i n tervention airncd at neutralizing those threats.-'9
But vve do n o t necess<l rily need a " new framework."So

Rather,

-vve need a recognition that t h i s obligation has existed a l l along.

1884,

in

a

case

involving

vvhether

the

U nited

States

Jn

could

crimi nalize the counterfeiting of foreign currencies, the Supreme
Court noted

that " t h e l21w of nations requires every nationc11

government t o use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done
w i t h i n its o-vvn d o m i n i o n to another nation w i t h w h i c h it is a t
peace, o r to the people thcreof."51 The C o u r t further noted that:
[E]very

nation

has

not

only

the

right

to

require

the

protection, CI S far as possible, of its own credit abroad
against fraud, bu t the banks and other great commercial
corporations

which

have been created

within

its

own

j u risdiction for the advancement o f the public good may
call on it to see that their i n terests are not neglected by a
foreign govermnent to whose dominion they have, i n the
lawful prosecution o f their business, become to some extent
subjected.52
Executive practice on t h i s point is also long-standing.
exam.ple,

i n a situation s i m i l a r to that o f bin Laden and

For
the

Northwest Tribal Region of Pakistan, President 'vVoodrow Wilson
a u thorized a cavalry expedition i n t o northern 1Vlexico against
Mexican opposition lee1dcr Francisco "Pancho"
attacked the U n i ted States.

Villa who he1d

The Mexican governm.ent had l i ttle

control over the northern part of Mexico and was waging its own
u nsuccessful battle against Villa.

The U.S. Secretary of State

add ressed a note to the Foreign Mi nister of the "de facto" Mexican
government stating that the " Un i ted States Government cannot
allow marauding bands to establish themselves u p o n its borders
with l iberty to invade and plunder Uni ted Sta tes territory w i t h
�9 Chcrtoff, �upm note 27, a t 144.
50

!d.

5 1 United States

v.

Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887).

52 !d. at 486.
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impunity, a n d then, when �1u rs ued , to tc1ke refuge across the R i o

Grande under p ro lcc lio n Df th e pleo of the

integrity of the soi l of
the Mexiccm Repuul ic. "<..�
Aflcr much political Cllld d ipiLHitcttic
effort, General " Black ]8ck" Pt� rsh i ng was ordered to cross into
Mexico, b u t to withdraw tn " A m erican te r ri to ry a s so on as the de
facto government in Mexico '"'as ,1 ble to relieve [h i s troopsj of this
work periocl."5-t The President essentially j us ti fi e d the cross-border
i n c ursion on the principle of sel f-defense,"; but alsL) sought tacit
consent from the d e facto 1'-.'le'<ican lea der, General Carr<mza,s6 just
as i t ap pea rs President Ob,1 rn,1 is d o i n g with [>at<istan.�'
Jn the com i ng decades, the U n i ted SlC1tes will likely tRke a
leading role in further d u� l i n g of( this o bl ig<1 t io n <md fleshing out
the necessary and pro po rtio na l me21sures victim-states cnn u.se to

defend themselves when on� nation's inability to keep its own

house i n order threatens tbe territorial i n teg r i ty and

politiccll

independence of other slates.

2.3. Article Sl and No Stntt·
Tf we pul the state nexus a n a lysis on a continuum, we go from

overt a n d aggressive state a c t i o n (SLlCll as a n nrmed attack by a
na tim1' s armed forces), to "effective control'' to the inability to
control. But at ea ch poi nt on t h is continuum, the state still exists.

s.> Amos 5. Hershey, 1/lctJrsions lllto t\llexicn and lite Ovctrinc tl( Hoi Pursuit. 13
"
At--1 . J. 1:--JT'L L. 557, 561 (i919).
5-t John J . Pershing, Report by ;\1[,1jor Gcncml jultll f. Pcrshi11g, Gl/11/llflildiug, of the
Punitive Expeditiv11 (Colonia Dublan: l·{eadquarters, Punitive Expedition, 1 916), 3,
cited in John M. Cyrulik, A Strutl:gk Exnminntion ;.1( thL: Punitive Expedition into
Mexico, 1916-1917 Qune 6, 2003) (un pt1blished M.A thesis, U.S. Army Con1n1and
and General Staff College), tl"Uoiltl/Jie ol http;/ /stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/CetTRDoc
? AD=A4J 6074&l.ocation=LJ2&d,JL=-Getl'l{ Doc. pdi
55 Though Secret,Hy Lmsing did 11L)t explicitly mcntic'n sel f-defense, he
stated that the efforts were mee1su n:s uf "lllJt pursuit." )'(JCH(lLA.S M. P0ULA�TZAS,
THE RIGHT OF HOr PURSUIT i\l \NTF.R�Art0NAL LAW -�-� n.:?:! (2d cd. 2002). American
commentators of the time c:onsidl'r0d such measures tn bl' an aspt·cl of self
defense. Sec Rex. J. ZL:dalis, Prvtccliou of N(ltiouul� Al>rilild: 1::. CVII�i!llf tltt' Bn�i:; of
Legol 0/1/ignlio11?, 25 TF:\. INT'L LL 209, 243 (l99D) (citing J, MOORE, A D rcE..c;-r or
INTI:RNATIONAL LAW 418-425 (1 9li6)) (cl<�s:oif)'ing the pursuit of mariludcrs under
the general heCiding of "Plea of Nt<u:s�ary 5clf-Ddense"); Hcr�h�\·, ,:;iipra note 33,
i'lt SGS ("[T]here is ample prL'cidl!nt for tlw pr<1ctkc �Ji 'h11t pur::.uit' in u u r past
relc1tions with Mtxico.'').
.s,

5i

Se/1/JIL': L11 Ft�IIL'flc Re�tJ/Iltioll, Appnn>ing Usc of
Mexico, Adllplctf, N.Y. T1�1ES, lvlurch Hi, ·t916.

Presidml's Aclion;; 1111/0rs<'d i11

1/11' Afill!J in

Karen De Young & Joby WCI JTick,

1\irstrikes, WASH.

Pnkistclll and U.S. Hat>t: rt?dt Deal on

POST, November 16, 2008, at AI.
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J f a state has effective] y ceased Lo exist, however, then it follows
thc-1t there are no ius ad bel/11111 concerns.
With the phenomenon of slate failure u n l i kely to go away,
worth questioning the lega l effects of

state that h a s ceased to be.

C1

Tht· Restatement (Third) of the Ful-cign Relations
Uni ted Stc. tes defines a "state" C1S

M1

it is

Law o f the

" e n t i ty that h a s a defined

lcrritnry and a permanent popula tion, under the cnntrbl of its own
gm crnmJ::>nl, and that engages in, o r hclS the

fnnn<�l

ca paci ty

to engage in,

relations with other such enli lie�.";,:;

Given this definition, would SomJiicl, for c�ample, be
I t h a s not had a n effective government for
Eth iopian withdrawal after two yeJrs

t.he

a

n

st,1 t e ?

l ong lime, and the

of ineffectual clSSislance to

trans itional goveTnment has kicked L)ff yet e1nother scrCi mble

,1mung

warrin g

Islamist

factions

to

Scn1lcl. lia iltself a d m i ts to four internal
three-fourths o f its

1990

take

over

the

cess ions and

se

coun try.''�

c l a i ms that

territory has been "gripped by civil war at

some po1nt u p until this date."&n

the other hand, Somalia is s t i l l listed as a Member o f the
U n i lcd Na tions, <tnd nations around the world have entered into
formal debates over w het her to recogn ize Sonwlia, Somaliland, or
On

both.

ln

May 20061 the Transi{iona1 Pllrl iamenl was formed

and

beg;:m to assert itself within Somalia. fn March 2006, the European
Union

resolved

Somalia/"61

to

while

"enhance
the

and

broc1 d e n

lnternati oncl l

its

Mc1ritime

relations

with

Organization

specifically mentions t h a t it is " respecting ful ly the sovereignty,
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity of Somal ia11

while i t tries to dea l w i t h the scourge of piracy off its shores .62
The question of recognition

is more a political than a IegaI

q u estion, and it need n o t be decided here. Suffice lo say1 however,
that in teJtT1a tion"l l a w provides mult iple avenues for a state to
protect itself which correlate to the multi pl'2 obligations states have

... Rt.':;TATF.t<•IENT (THIRD) OF FORF.ICN RFLAIIUt\!:> LA\·V OF THL uNITED STATES §

=

201

(J 987).

''' iVIuhamed Ibrahim & jeffrey GettlL'mc�n, 1-:lilivpiou .:: Withdrmu Jrolll Kc_!f r,,,::c-..

N.Y. Tt;...n:s,

]i:ln. 13, 2009, at A6.

•

,..,, Perrnt:�m!nt Mission of Somnlin to the United N,1tions, Country Fncts,
ht�p:/ /wvnv2.un.int/public/Somalia/ !/English/ (lost ,•isited Apr. 5, 20()9).
"I
EurOpo.:>.:�n Union @ Uni ted Natinns: P.1rtnership in t\ction, EU Council
C(ll1clusions on Somalia, hllp:j jwww .euwp<H�u-un.org/ artides/ en/ Mtic l c
_38'16_en.htm (l<�st visiied Mar. 5, 2009).
"l Int'l Maritime Org. [ T MOJ, Pimcy and Ar111erl nobbery Ag11i11st Ships i11 Watt>r�
Oj/ tlu! Coast ofSolllnlia, al 4, 1MO Doc. A 24/RES/ 979 (Feb. 6, 2006).
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to ensure peaceful coexistence w i t h other states.

And i.f a state is

not really a state, yet its nominal terri tory is being used to threaten
viable

states

and

i.nten1ational

peace

and

security,

then

international law should preference the rights of the viable state
over the nonexistent state.
3.

WITHIN AND BEYOND BORDERS: THE [US I N BELLO
REQUIREM ENTS

Once the United States is legally i n a territory, or at war vvith
another

state

regardless

of

the

initial

legali ty,

the

questions

become: (a) \.v honl can the United States target; and (b) hcw.r must
the

U n i ted

States

treat

its

captives.

These

are

m01nentous

questions that w i l l continue to dominate the jurisprudence of war
in the cotning decades.

But to achieve greater clarity on this

question and reap the full range of benefits the law affords, we
must look back to examine the relationship of the actor to a state.
Despite the assault on the state that terrorists vvage, and despite
their power to transcend state boundaries to use globalization's
n1iraclcs against the globe, when it comes to using force against
terrorists in the legally and strategically appropriate way, their
relationship to a state is the most important factor.

Targeting n nd Detaining Those TNlw Tnke "Direct Part in
Hostilities"

3.1.

I t may seem obvious, but the term " enemy con1.batant" is made
u p of two word s - " enemy" and "co.mba tant." Over the past eight
years,

however,

many

have

conflated

the

two,

or

focused

exclusi vely on the second word, causing so much of the legal and
strategic confusion in this area. The time has come to take back the
enemv .
.I

The clear rule should be:

a combatant who is also a n enemy

can be targeted and detairted as a POW, and a n enemy is defined
as it always has been, as a person connected w i th a state engaged
in hostilities with the United States. Only once someone is both an
enem v
.I a n d a combatant do we then look to see whether he is a n
unlawfu I enemy combatant.

To help bring about this empowering clarity, let's say that
d u r i n g the first months of the War in Afghanistan, there was a
fighter known to design, build, and place improvised explosive
devices on main convoy routes tlu-oughout Kabul at the direction
of the Taliban. Could the military target him? What about if that
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snuck int0 tht� United States and was planning to
bom.b t he Geo rgl� VVC1s h 1 n g t o n B r i dge between New York 21nd New
J e-rsey ? Wha t i f the fi gh ter was a Ca n a d ian bomb s peci a l i s t wjtb no
same insurgent

d i rect connection to Afghanistan and was plotting to p l c m t a bomb

on the George Wa s h i n g lon Bridge?
The first question w e need to
3.7.1.

a n swe r

is: who i s

an enemy?

Qucstion 1 : Is /w a n ene/lllf?

Crilicnl evaluation and a p p l ication of this l ega l term, " l hl'
enemy," will likely receive a suhstanticl l rerwissance in the Cl1111inb
years. Up until 9/ J l-�

"

e nemy " has consistently been defined as it

has been w i t h i n thl:' law of nations - as a s u bject of a n opposing
I n jo/Jil50II u. Ei:;entmgcr, for example, Justice Robert jackson
defined ''the enemy" i n its "priiT12n·y me21n ing" as the " s u bject of a
foreign slulc at war with the United Sta tcs."63 During the Civil
War, iL w a s defined the s a m e way b y Francis Lieber and A b r a h a m
Lincoln: " [ t]he ci tize n or na ti ve of a hostile country is thus a n

state.

enemy, a s one o f the constituents of t h e hostile state o r nation, and
as such is subjected to the hardships of th e

"
war. 64

There are esse n tia l l y lwo kinds of enemy
the first

res i de n ti a l

in constitutional lavv,

and lhe second directionaL

The latter a re

enemies n o t becclLlSC they reside in. or are citizens of a bell igerent
state as are the fo r m e r, but because they are working for t h a t state.

The two l a nd mar k Supreme Cmut dec i s i ons of Ex Pnrte

Quirirzb3

Ex Pnrte Milligan6r, d i ffer from each other precisely on th e basis
of this state nexus requirement and state actor distinction.
In
Quirin, the Court granted habeas review, but u phel d mili tary
commission.sr for eight Germ21n saboteurs who l a n d ed along the

and

East Coast of the United

Slates during WWlt stashed

their

'' � Johnson \ ' . Eis;:-nlrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950).
Writing for the
mnjorily, Justice jilckson also wrote that " i\ m erican doctrine as to effect nf war
upon the Sl<llus l�f liJlkmals of belligerents took permanent shape followinr.; our
first forCc ign w �r. Chancellor Kt..'nt, <�ftL:r considering the leading authorities of his
time, liCLIMecl lh� bw to be Lhat ' . . . in war, the subjects of each countr�' were
enemit.:s to t.:>nch ,..,ther. an.d bound to I'L'g:�rd ,111li t rea l each oth.e( as such.''' /d. <�t
771 (f)IIC•tiug G 1·is1\'llld v. W add i ng ton, 16 ]0hns. Cas. 438, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1 $ 1 9)).
M Fr\,\NCf:S LrEHL:R, U.S. WAR DEI''T, J\ l11UT.-\1
\ T GENERAL'S OFPICE, Gl;,\lE!<AL
OJ<DF.RS Nu. 100, Mt. 2l ( !�63), ili'flilablc at http://avalon.law.yale.edu / l 9th
_century/ I ieber.asp [ hereina ftcr Tl1c Lieber C11dcl .
65 E:t Parte Qu i rin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
66 Ex Parte tv'lilligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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uniforms, cHid took steps to sabotage elements within the U n i ted
States.67
ln Milligan, on the other hand, the Supreme Court struck down
the legality of the court martial of Lamdin M i l l igan who had
commun icated with the Confederacy, conspired to seize m u n i tions
of war, and joined a secret society for the p u r pose of overthrowing
the Government of the United Sta tes, because M i l ligan lacked the
necessary state affiliation/'s He never joined the Confederacy, was
never d irected by it, nor did he ever live in the South.69
Accordingly, the Quirin Court reaffirmed that Milligan d i ffered
from its defendants becwuse M i l l igan vvas a "non-belligerent" and
so " n o t subject to the law of war."70 The Quirin defendants, on the
other hand, were directed by the sta te, while M i l ligan's affiliation
lacked this top-dovvn
associate

themselves

relationship.
with

the

Thus, even ci tizens who

" m il i tary

ann

of

the enemy
and direction enter this

government, and witlt its a id, guidance
country bent on hostile Rcts," are enemy combatants who can be
1
detained and tried accord i n glv.7
,
,
Despite recent attem.pts to broaden the definition of the enemy
beyond its s ta te nexus, 72 the traditional definition will l i kely hold,
not only because it fits with the original u nderstan d i n g of the
Constitution, but also because stripping "the enemy" from its state
J

moorings causes structural contradiction and erosion

in

the

67

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1-2.

6S

See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6 ( discussing Milligan's lack of personal ties to the

enemy).

69 Id. at 101-2; ::.ee abo Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that Merryman's status as a civilian from Maryland
precluded the military from exercising judicial authority over him).
7u Quiri11, 317 U.S. at -15.
7L Id. at 37-38 (emphasis e1dded).
n See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the
Sec'y of the lavy 1 (July 7, 200-l), l1i.'<7ilnblr: at http:/ jwww.defenselink.mil/news
/Jul2004/d20040707review pdf (establishing a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal); Memorandum for d istribution from Scc'y of the Navy 2 (July 29, 2004),
http:/ j wh' W.ddenselink. mil j news/J ul2004j d20040730cOtTtb. pdf
nvnilable
at
(regarding the implement<Ltion of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
procedures). Both these memorc1nda define the "enemy combatant" as "an
individual who vvas part of or supporting Taliban or al Qacda forces, or
associated forces that <1rc engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has d irectly supported hostilities in e1id of enemy armed forces."
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra, at 1; Memorandum from Sec'y of the
Navy, supra, Enclosure (1), at 1.
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Constitution73
While

the

well

as

as

P11. f. lnt'J L.
srrat0gically

current Supreme Court

[ Vo l .
deleterious

has

not yet

30:4

decisions.'-!

ruled

on

the

definition of an enemy in the term " enemy combatant,'' i t w i l l have
to eventually, and Hallldi strongly hinls thal it w i l l recogmze the
dispositive role of the state:
The habeas petition states only that 'when seized by the
Un ited

Stotes

Afghanistan.'
which

Government,

combat

concession

Mr.

Hamdi

resided

in

An assertion that one resided in a country in

that

operations
one

was

<lre

taking

'capturfd iJ1

pl�cc

is

not

a

a zone of active

combat' operations i n a foreign thc,lh"r of war, and certainly
is not a concession that one was 'part of or supporting
forces hostile to the U n i ted Sta les or conli tiun partners' and
' e.n gC�ged in a n armed conflict against the United Stales. '7"'
Therefore, as a n Afghani nation.:ll,

cnJr

first fighter is a n e/LeJilYr

whether he plants the bomb i n Afgh<mistan or i n the United States.
The Canadian bomb specialist, on the other h a n d , while a vile
individual, is not a constitutional enemy since he has no d i rectional
affiliation w i t h a state engaged in hostili ties w i t h the U.S.

<;; Set', P.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, S:.i,.+ F.3d 2.13, 243 (-lth C i r 2008) (Mot'z, J
concurring) (;on exp<msive definition of enemy con1batant r.:nders the t�rm
"utter I y maIleable" and "presents serious consti tu tionnl conc�rns'') PllCil ted, 77
.

U.S.L W. 3-1.99 (Mar. 6,

2009).

.,

For example, former Bush Administration dden-"L' official, Matthew
Waxman, using the GuantRnamo Bny detention t.1Cility as <1n e>..amplc, writes that
the "widespread perceptiOt) that it exists simply to h..el'p detainees furever bcyund
the n'aLh of t he law'' is "a clrng on Arnerice1's . . . global counterterrorism efiorts,"
hampcrtng "cooperation with our friend:. un such cri tic.1 l counterterrorism tasks
as information sharing, joint military operations and luw enforcement." ''I know,"
he continues, "As a State Department oth:i.:- d, I often spent V<J luable time ;:�nd
diplomntic capital fruitlessly de-fending ��ur detention practices rdther than
fcl::;tering counterterrorism tt:;amwork_" M.:�tlbew Wa:-.man, The S111nrt ltVay to 5/wt
Git111n IJOWII, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at l34.
7'i Hr1tncli v. Rumsfdd, 542 U.S . .507, 526-27 (2004) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted). While justice O'Connor· stated that the Majority w::ts speaking
"narrowly" on the definition of em enemy combatRnt in this decision, there is
nothing i;1 constitutional 1-tistory or practice to indicate that i t could be ex11anded
to no longer require a sta te affiliation. Td. at 510.
:;•
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Question 2: Is lzc a co111ba tont?

3 . 1 .2 .

Anyone residing in the enemy stabe can be a n enemy, even

a

baby.7<>
But enemies cannot be targeted u n less they are also
combatants.
Enemies have traditionally been subject to restrictions on
commercial and legal rights, 77 b u t they are genera l l y protected
fron1 targetingJS They lose that protection i f they take up arrns i n
the conflict. Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I to the Genev<:l
Com·en tions states that, "Civilians sha 11 enjoy the protection
afforded bv this Section, u nless and for such time as thev take a
direct part i n hostilities."7':i I n other words, by taking a d i rect part
i n hostilit ies, enemies become enemy combatants eligible for
targeting Upon ca p t u re, however, onlly those enemy combatants
with a top-dovvn connection to a bell igerent state can
�

J

constitutionally be POWs.
To return to o u r hypothetical Afghani fi ghter, since he is taking
a " d i rect part i n hostili ties" on behalf of the Taliban, he is an enemy

76 See. e.g., The Prize Ce1ses, 67 U.S. 635, 687 (1862) (Nelson, J., dissenting)
("The legal consequences resulting from <1 ste1te of war between two countries at
this day are well understood, and will be found described in every approved
work on the subject of internatione1! law. The people of the two countries become
immediCitely the enemies of each other . . . . "). See nl::o Le1mar v. Browne, 92 U.S.
187, 194 (1875) ("In war, e1ll residents of enemy country are enemies.").
77 See, e.g., The Rapid, 12 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1814) ("'n the state of war, nation
is known to ne1tion only by their armed exterior; each threatening the other with
conquest or annihilation. The individuals who compose the belligerent states,
exist, as to e(lch other, in a ste1te of utter occlusion. Jf thev meet, it is onlv in
combat."); �ce also 77te Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 674 (depriving neutral ships in a
Confederate port of their property rights on a·ccount of their e1ifiliation with a
belligerent nation); je1ckson v. Decker, n Johns. 4J 8 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 181-l) (barring
an e1lien enemy, residing in the enemy's country, from maintaining an action of
ejectment for lands during war); Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813) (discussing the suspension of an alien enemy's right of action during w<�r).
71( For internatione1l armed conflicts, :;ee Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Arn1ed Conflicts art. 51(1)-(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 31
(hereinafter Protocol 1). For non-international armed conflict, ::.ce Additione1l
Protocol II to the Cenev<l Conventions of August 12 19,19, Re!nting to the
Protection of Victims of Non-Jntern<1tional Armed Conflicts art. 13{2), ]] 23
U.N.T.S. 609. While a number of states, including the U.S. C1rc not parties to the
Additional Protocol, this aspect of the princi.ple of distinction is customan·
intern<ttione1l law, binding on all. See CUSTOMM�Y INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARI:\�
LAW 19-24 Oean-l\tfarie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2005).
i9 See Protocol !, suprn note 78, art. 51 (3).
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comba ta n t el i gi bl e for targe ti n g as weJl c1s for indefinite d e ten t i on .�o
The fr a n1 ers of the Geneva Conventtons adopted the following

understanding

of the phrase

"

d i rec t part in

President has found indistinguishable
standard under the l a w of war..31
action on

the battlefield

ll

hoslilities/' which the
from the d i rect pa rtici pt�t io n

m ean s " i mmediate a n d aclual

l i kely lo cause harm to the enen\V because

there is a d irect causa I re l a t i ons hi p bet"veen the a c t i v i t y engaged in
and the l1c:nn1 done to the enemy.".'\:! l t does n o t mean ''indirect
participation in hostilities, such as ga th eri ng a n d

t ra n s m i tt i n g

military information, transporting weapons, m u n i tions, or other

uppl i es or forward deploymcnt l/1{\
Of course the d i fficulties l i e in the specifics.
How do you
define "hostilities,'' ;,direct pa rt, and "fur such time"? A seTies o f
Expert Meetings co-organized by the international Conunittee o f
the Red CToss (" l CRC'') a n d the l'MC Asser Institute soug h t to

s

,

,

"

clarify

these

d rama tical ly

terms as the import<ntec of them
with

the

growing

involvement

he1s increased

of

civilians

in

t hey ha ve gen e rat ed very detailed re p o r ts,�" n o
yet defined Article 51 (3), o r sought to expand upon
the understanding hom the Protocols.
hostilities.

While

U.S. co ur t has

tlo ld. arts. 4-5.
Se�: also Prosecutor v. Akavesu, Case No. JCTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, � 629 (Sep t. 1, 1998) (concluding that there .is no difference in practice
between "direct" <lnd "clctive" involvement in hostilities), tWIIi/tlble t7t
hltp: / /69.94.11.53/ ENC USH/cases/ Akayesu/j udgementj akay001 .htm;
The
I Tosle�ges Trial (Trial of Wilhelm·List and Others), U.S. Military Trib., Nmemberg
July R, 1947-Feb. 19, 19-!S, rcprintt'it in 8 United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lnw Reports of Trials of Wor Crimin<:l ls 34, 58 (1 949) ("We think the rule is
established tha t a civilian who aids, ilbets, ()r pt11tir.ip<l tes in the fighting is liable to
punishment as a war criminal under the laws of war."). \Nhile the United States
has not ratified Protocol 1, il has formaUv endorsed this definition of a
permissibly-targeted ci\'iliMl in signing (in 2000) and ri'ltirying (in 2002) the
Optional Protocol to lhc Convention on lh� Hights of the Child on lhe
Involvement of Children i n Armed Conflict Protocols to th� Cnnventions on the
Rights of the child, May 25, 2000, S. Treaty Due No. 106-37, 39 (accession by
United States, Feb. 12, ::!002).
Sl Jd.
'H
s•

fd�
/d.

:;..t Tnternalionnl Committee of the Red Cross, Fi rst through Third Exp12rt
Meetings, on Lhe Notion of Direct Pm-ticip<�tion in Hostilities, Summary
Reports, 2005, htlp:j/ www.icrc.org/Web/cng/siteengO nsfjhtmlj participal1on
-hostilities-ih.l-311205
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decision1 has e x plai n ed its view of

" d i rcct
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highJy reno wned

pnrt in hostilities."s5

Judge B<'1rC1k concluded that th e class of civilians taking a direct
pe1rt i n the hostilities inclu des those bearing arms
conccaJed) on their way to or

frrm

(o pe n ly

or

the pl,1 ce where they use them

against the enemy .sr, He also l ists oul the harder cases, incl udi n g:

(.:�) persons

col l ecti n g inte l l igence about the enen1y arrny; (b)

pl�r.sons transporting unlawful combatants to or from th e place of

combat; (c) persons who, wherever they are locn te d , operdtc
wel1pons to be used by lhe unlmvful con1batan ts, or s u pervise such
o

pera ti o n,

or provide service tL) them; (d) civilians d r i vi ng trucks

w
· ith (lJlliTIUnHion to the place of

com bat;

(e)

serv i ng as a human shield to terrorists;
u n lawful

co m b a t 21 n t s

(f)

c i v i l i a ns

del iber<�tcly

per s on s w h o enlisl

or send them t<> c o m m i t h osti l i t ies and (g)

civilians who decide upon or pl.:tn

Cl r mcd

hostili ties.o7

On the other hand, the class of ci v i l i a ns Judge Barak d i d not

consider as havtng taken direct pe1rt in the hosti l i t ies included: (a) a
civilian w h o

" general l y

s u p �1orls the hos t i l i t i es against the army;"

(b) persons who aid the un J aw fu l combatants by genera l strategic

<ma lysis; as well as (c) those who give them ge ne ral logistical or
monetury support; or (d) those d i s trib u t i n g propaganda for the
Lmlawfut combatan ts.�ii
This survey of the lsr3eli o p i n i o n of

"d

i rect

p a r t i n hoslili ties"

serves as a u se fu l starting poin t for what Article 51(3) could meC�n

Fourth
Wrig/zf:i'-1 has brietly alluded to this standard,

i n practice for the U.S. In fact, the tluec-judge panel of the

Circuit i11 Al-Mnrri

v.

a l tho u g h i t did not define the standard.

The panel indicated that

no S u p rem e Cour t p recede nt o r fourlh Circuit op i n i on en dorses
the vie w that

" fo r

such

ti me as

they

take a

d i rect part i n

ho sti l i t ies," participants i n non-i nternational armed conflicts may,
<IS

<.1

mC\tter of customary internationcl l lnw, be p l aced in the formal

l ega l cC1 tcgory

of

"enemy combat<1nt.""OWe should expect, and

&> See HC] 769/02 Pub. Comm. againc;t Torture in Israel v. lsrael [20061. �� 30,
http:/ j t.'! .vwnl .court.gov. il/ f\les_�nb/ 0'2/ 690/007I a 3-!/02007690.a34. pdf.
Sl• /d. ,j 34.
ll7 M
,<$ ltl.

�1 35.
•1 3-l-35;

S<'C a/:;a id. �·r :'.9--10 (Bu�·ak, J.) (defining the "for such time··
dt>mcnl)
�" AI-Mcuri v. W1ight, 487 f.3d 1 60, 183 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en bane suL1
JIVIIL, AI-Marri v . Pt1cciare1li, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom, Al-Man·i
v. Spagone, 77 U.S.L.W. 3499 (Mar. 6, 2009).
"11 ld. a t 185 n.l3.
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bope fo r1 much

tTlOre

cl ari fic a tio n in the

c a ses like AI-Morri move lo civilian,
echelon

m i l i ta ry

[ V o l . 30:J

coming vc"1 rs,

cr i mi na l

especi a ll y as

courtsl)1 and hi ghe r

commanders and civ i l i a n leadership p l a n futltre

cngagernents and provide rules of engagcrnent to future forces on
the ground.

Questio11 3: Is he a lawful or UJ!lrm�jitl collll1aftliJ.t?

3 . 1 .3.

So to ttlke stock o f where we are, enemies, properly iden tified
dS

subjects C1f

i'l

fo re ign state at war •d i th tbl.' U.S., who take a

" d i rect pdrt in h os ti l i ties , " are legiLimc�te tar�cts of attack.
nffiliation is d i recti ona l,
state

a c to rs

l1S

it was in

Quirin,

If

th<"'t

th ese i n d ividuclls are

and can be cl<1ssified a s either lavvful or u n l c1w£ul

enemy cornbat,lnls depending on lht.'ir Jctions.

If the state is not

di rec t i ng their Clctions, these enemy indiv iduals mC\y be ta rgete d

If

for such time as they are taking d i rect part i n ho sti l i ties .

c<�pturecl, however, t hey cannot b e constitution<\lly

h·eated as

P0\1\Ts becclUse they are non-state ac to rs.

Therefore,
an

A fghan i

a

noD-u niformed, non-state actor who selts a n JED o n

road

loses h i s protected

status a n d

becomes

a

comba ta_nt wt10 can be targeted, e1t lee�st while he is i n the process
of se ttin g the e xplosi v e .n Because of l1is p resence in tlw territory of
the enem.y

(i.e.,

Afgha nistan), he is also

unlawful bell igerency

(i.e.,

an

enemy combatant. His

figh t i n g w i t h o u t a u n iform, etc.) strips

him o f pro tected status u pon capture, and subjects h i m to either:
(a) trial for his criminal actions against li.S. perso n n el ;

or

(b)

t ri a l

for espionage/ sabotage.
lf this non-uniformed individual is a c tu a J iy acting on behalf of
a state and plan ti ng bombs either i n Afghanistan or in the United

States; the Un ited Slates nlso has the option of de ta i ning him as a
POWLI' and/ o r h·ying h i m via mili ta ry commis.sion _��"

9 1 5L'C David Johnston and Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Cit'c
Ciuilirw Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A'!.
'12

Qaeda Suspect

rl

1\:::.

d isc ussed aboYe, the "for such tlrne as'' element is ,dsn d i ffk u l l t·l•
The ICRC Third Expert Meeting discuSst!cl fnur nwill appro<IChes tt'
targeting civiliLlnS for �tiLh t ime as Lhey d i rect ly parti..:ipate in ho!;tili ties: ('I) the
specific acts <�pproach; (2) th12 uffirmativc discn�<�gemenr ,1pproe1ch; (3) the
membership approach; and H) the l i m ited memt'>ership Clpproach. Sec supm note

dt>fi n12.

S..J..

y; As the Court i n Hnmdi expbincd, the p u rpose of dete n tion is not
indivtduals from retLtrning tv the
fi el d of battle <md taking up arms once again. I fa md i v. Rumsfelcl, 542 U.S. 507,
punishment, but merely to prevenl ca p t ured

518 (2004).
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If, on t h e other hand, the individual o n l y affili21ted hililsc�f with

a foreign state, or a cause, but was not acting at the d irection of a
nation engaged in hostilities with the U.S., and he set a n IED i n the
United States, upon capture he would be a civilian, non-state actor
like M illigan (i.e., a non-enemy). Similarly, if an American, with a
U.S. passport, un lavvfu l l y killed someone in France, he would be
subject to French don1estic laws, with no combatant imrnuni ty, and
France would have no legitimate recourse against the United States
�.-vithin the laws of war. The exact same an21lysis would hold if the
American had killed 3,000 P21risians.
3.2. Targeting and Detaining Other Non-State Actors: Piracy aud
Piratical Terroris111

There are additional, well-defined, and age-old categories of
non-state actors who can be targeted, even without the presence of
fon11 a l hostilities.
If terrorists commit violent acts on the high seas or otherwise
outside the jurisdiction of any state, they are effectively pirates95
9� Of course, i f the United States does choose to detain him until the end of
the conflict or try him vi<� m il itary commission, the United States rnust also
recognize th<�t under the Geneva Conventions, the q uesti oning of prisoners of war
is lim ited. According to the Third Geneva Convention, "Every prisoner of war,
when q uestioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names
and rank, date of birth, and arn1y, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing
this eq uiva lent information." See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of Wa r art. 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Furthermore "[n]o ph ysical or mental torture, nor any other form o f coercion,
may be i nflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them inform<�tion of any kind
whntev�r. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may 110l be tlir�atE::!!led,
insu l ted , or exposed to u npleasan t or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." ld.
If the United States values de tailed i nterrogation over non judicial detention, the
United States may prefer prosecuting the individual for espionage or for criminal
actions such as at tempted murder. Plea deals can be made in exchange for
ongoing cooperation, and even if the suspect invokes a l<�wyer during initinl
questioning, the interrogation can still continue so long as the Government
understands that it will li kely not be <�ble to use the information de rived agains t
the suspect.
Y5 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10,
1982, ·1.833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (defining p iracy, in part, as a ny
ilkgal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, commi t ted for
pri vate ends by the crew or the p<�ssengers of a private ship or a pri \ a te aircraft,
and directed: (i) on the high seas, <1gainst another ship or a i rcraft, or ag<�inst
persons or property on bo<�rd such shi p or a ircra ft; or (ii) against a ship, aircraft.
persons or property in " place outside the jurisdiction of any State"). While the
United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, these provisions are considered
customary international law. Moreover, the United States is a party to the Geneva
Convention on the Hi gh Seas; Article 19 of the Convention has an identical
,

,

-

"

'
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whom m i lil.uies can engage.% What is so often overlooked - a nd
should no longer be- is the overlap betv"·een pirates a n d certain
While

terror.ists.
Conventions,

the

which

Comrnenlnry

also

to

the

pir<1cy,

defined

1958

High

Seas

l h C1 t

acts

reports

commi tted outside the ju risdict ion o f any state were "chiefly"
meant to include e:Kts committed by
constituting term nullius or on
lcrritory,•J;-

the

principle

un�overncd territories.

ship or aircraft on n n island

Cl

the shores of an

logically

applies

to

u n occupied

failed

st8tes

or

The international com m m 1 i t y should not

hcl\:e to •;it impotently by w h .i l e violent acts against countries
emana tl' from criminaLly law less locales.
B u t t.:h:-spite the logic of this precept, many h<wc a rgued t h a t
pi r<KY

cannot

equal

terrorism.

fhey

argue

thal

politicnlly

technica l l y immune from the Law tJf the Sea's
p i rClcy provision because piracy must be ''for private etlds.'1 9·" They
lliOLivatL::d E\CtS

cl l'C

c1ssume t b a t " for private ends" means tha t a polit iGtl motive
transforms

a

pjrate into scn11e other being. That view i s be1sed o n

a n incorrect reading of the relevant laws and history:)•J While the

prO\'lSIOil. Geneva Convention on th� High Seas .lrt. 19, Apr. 29, 1 958, 13 v.s:t .
2312, 4.50 U. N.T.S. 81.

�trpm note 95, art. H: "f\ I I States

"f' See Geneva Convention on the High Seas,

shall (llOpt!rate to Lhe fullest possibk extent in the repr�ession of piracy on the high
seas

or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State." See al�a id., art. l9:

"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction o r any State, every
Stale mc1y seize a pirate ship or a i rcrofl, or a s hip or a i rcraft taken by piracy and

under the control of pirates, and ::trrest the persons and seize the property on
board."
'1' U . N .

I n ternational

Law Commission,

1\cpor/

t�{ t/11.:

illtt:mnlionol

Lnw

CtHttmi�sio;t fu tirl' Gencrnl J\�:;cntlJ!y, 2 U . N . G/\OR Su pp. (No. 9), U.l\.'. Doc. t\/3l5lJ
.
'
?�?
" Y.B. I nt '1 L. Comm n "-..,
· ·tt>•·>b), ILJJrlllht· ·f 111
. 119-6]
t· J
_
_:J,), _:::;
_, U· .L'l
... . D01.:.
(Ju Iy -i,
. •

· ·

A/CNA/SER.A/ l956/ Add.L

\!X Set', e.s., Tina Gclrm(ln, II!IL'nwlivnal Lac£' o
f t:rc Sm: Ri!WIIciliiiS the l. .,m• 4
PinTL�/ an d Tl!t'I'PI'!:'III i11 t!Ic Wake of Scph:m/1er 1 '1111, 17 TUL. Mi\1<. L. I. 257 (2002)

(onal.v t.:in):; disp,wate tret\tment uf pirtiC\' <md terrorism under the l,1w of the se<1);

11 Wider N!!f: /\.ddn:ssillg /Jw l\tlnrifi111e Pirnry Pn1/)h'/11 in
]NT'L & Cot-.IP. L. REV. 149, 156 (stating that <;ince UNCLOS

sec a/:;p Erik Barrios, Ca!'-ti11�
Sv:r th,:ast 1\sia, 28 B.C.
''excludes attacks
region,1 1

liltll are

dissidents,

politically motivated,'' maritime crimes "commit ted by

including kidnapping:;

of

e w men to put pressure 011
l'il to n ke rs,

cr

regional governments nnd environmental att,1cks involving hijad,ed
;ue nnt pun i:;hable as piracy under UNC LOS.").

'''� Simi lrtrly, there is no two-ship requir�menl eith�r. The rapporteur for the

lnternatiLnMl Law Commission cited Oppenheim for the "consensus Clf the legal

opinion" that mutineers,

for exJmple, become pirates "when

the revolt is directed,

not n1erely «gainst the master, but also against the vessel, for the purpose oi

converting her and her good;� to their own use u
Mecti11g, f1955] 1 Y.B. fnl'l

Sww11ary Records o
f 1/Je 290t/I

L. Cornm'n 37, 42, U.N. Doc A/CN A/SER.A/ 1955
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Law of the Sea Convention does not a d d ress political acti v i t y or

define "for private ends/' the h i s tory of p i racy, the motives behind
the establishn1ent of universal j urisdic tion, and judicial preceden t
a l l demonstrate that a oirate cannot maraud withou t i m o u n i tv
mere l y by a d o p t i ng a political ca use _ ,oo
l

l

-

The true meaning of " for private ends" turns on the connection
of the i nd i v i d u a l to the state_ Those who act for p u b l i c ends are
state actors, "priva teers," vvho fall w i t h i n the laws of war. Those

who ac t "vith private ends arc non-state actors, " p i rates," vvho do
not fall w i thi n the la-vvs g(werning hos t i l i ties between states W t
According t o one o f t he earli est Su p reme Court decisions:
" Whence is it tha t pi ra tes have not th e rights of war? I s i t not
because t hey e1ct w i thout <� u th o rity and comm.iss io.n from their
sovereign ? " 102 A cc ordin g to the Lieber Code, p i rates a n d nonstate
combatants are therefore close cou sins :
Men, or squads of men who commi t hostili ties, whether by
,

fighting, or in roa ds for destruction or p l u nder, or by raids
of any kind, without conuni::;sion, without be i ng part and
portion of the organ ized hostile army, a. n d without sharing
continuously in the war, but vv ho d o so with i n termi tt ing
returns

to

occasional
p u rsui ts,

their

homes

ass ump tion
d i v es tin g

and

of

avocations,

t he

then1selves

or

semblance of
of

th e

with

the

pea cefu l

character

or

appearance o f soldiers- such men, or squads of men, are
not public enemies, and, there fore, if ca p tu red, are no t
entitled to the privileges of pri son ers of war, but slwll be
treated sum nwrily as liigflwny robbers or pirates.

103

(citing 1 L OPPENHEIM, INTEI�NATIO\lt\L LAW:

A TREATISE 437 (Ronald F Roxburgh
ed. 2005)). At no point did he require thnt the mutiny someho11v involve a second
ship to transform it int0 piracy.
1DO For a rnorc detailed discussion of this issue, as well as the issue involving
the so-called two-ship requirement, :;cc :VIichael Be1har, Attaining Opti111nl
tli!d Strategic TIIC:ory of Nm:o! Allti-Pimcy Opcrntious, 40
·1, 26-39 (2007).

Deterre11ce at Sea: A Legt?!
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
ll11

the Law

See, e.g.,

Michael

H.

Passm<:m,

Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates unda

ofWnr mtd Intemationol Law, 33 TuL. MAR. Lj. 1 (2008) (discussing possible

protections for captured pirntes as non-state actors).
102 Miller v. Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 4 (1781).
103 The Lieber Code, supra note 64, art. 82 (emphasis added).
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Because pirate::; arc targeted by m il i tary assets, but Clre then

prosecuted by civilian cou rts ,lO-I piracy provides powerfu l

st r a tegi c

lessons as well. I t prov es that warfighting and polic i ng can coexist
to combat great threats.

So, frcHn

<l

statc-c�ffiliated

ius ilL /Jdlo perspective, U.S. efforts to rep ress non

Cll

Qaeda

mern.bers

in

SomaliaW5

could

be

permissible since those me mbers' violent actions, llc\ving been

arguably comn1itted 01.1tside the j u risdktion o f <my state, lll<) could
be con!"id ered piracy in much the same way as P<mcho Vilis's
actions could h<lVE.'

been consid ered pira t i ca l in

Presi d en i

Wilson's

time.

3.3. Targeting tiiJtf Ocillillillg Other Non-State Actor�: lndiuidual or
Unil jt!lf-Oty�n�c
Fina lly , jusl as i n any domestic le�w enforcement

co n te

xt

or

standard m i l i tnry opert�tion, i t is a lways worth rem e m be ri ng that

non-sti:lte actors can be fired upon in i n d i v i d ual o r u n i t self
clcfense, tn7 ThLtS, if the F B l were lo raid t� suspected al QaedZJ safe
house in Nevv York Ci ty, it �would have to attempl an arrest first, i f
those J l Qaeda suspects were not ac t ing at the clin:!ction o f a

be llige re nt �tale, unless the al Qaeda su sp ects were tak 1i ng a direct
pa rt in hostilities

al

lhe time.HJH A d d i tionally, if in the course of the

1114 See. e.g., UNCLOS, �upm note

95, a rt. 105:

On t he hi�h Se<lS, or in any o ther place o u tside the jurisdiction of <my
State, every 5t::-�te may seize a pi rate ship or a irc ra ft, or i1 ship or a i rcraft
taken b)' pi racy i.Hid und�r the control of pirates, and <�rrcst tbl:! persons
and seiL.c the pmperty on board.

The courts of the St,1te which cnrtied

llw seiz.urc may d ec ide upon the pena l ti es to be imposed, ,, nd may
also d eterm ine the action tL) be taken with regard to the ships, a ircr,1ft or
property, �ubject to the rights of third pa rties <Kti ng i n good f,litl!t.

L1U t

111' Sn·, e.�., Jeffrey Cettleman & Eric Schmitt, US Fort·es r!rl' Missiles iulo
So111nlia at 11 Kcuyan, N,Y. Tii\tES, Mar. 8, z
:oos, at /\9 (reporting that, i1t1 March 2008,
the United Slt�tes :;truck Sti spected al Qaeda targets within Sorn;.;lie�).

w�o Set' �upm s�ction 2.3.

Jill

Se(·, cs., Ch::-� i rma n of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Instrucl'imr 3127 0 1 A
Slam/ins Rules t{ Enxasemt•nt Fur US ForCL'S, 1\-5 (Jan. 2000) (Actions in sdf-defense
may be taker\ in n:>sponst' to d '' hosti le action" or "hostile intent." Hostile a c ti on is
defined a::; ,1n "�,uacl< or other usc of furce" .and hos ti le intent is defined as a
" thre.1l ni i m nl in�:n t use of rnrce").
.

Ki ngdo m, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (s�:r, A) (1995). In
fron1 Northern lrel<md
in Gibraltar. The European Cou rt nf Human Rights determined thai: Enghmd had
illegally i mpinged upon their ri gh t lo l i fe un der article 2 of the European
Convention on Hum<1n Rights. The court wrote that "the use of lethal force
lll·'

Sec, e.g., McCann

.

v.

United

that cc1se, English agents shot t o death three IRA terrorists
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arrest, the suspects committed a hostile act or exhibited a n intent to

d o so, the FBI would be entitled to open fire in self-defense. Upon

capture, however, like p ira tes and other violent non-state actors,
the al-Qaeda s uspects would be subject to criminal laws and
procedures.

4.

CONCLUSION

By cla r i fyi 11 g i. n ternational cmd constitutional l a w and revea ling
the pivotal role of the state, the U n i ted Sta tes will find itself with a
powerful arsenal to combat terrorism.
Of cou rse, power through clarity w i l l never res u l t in a bsol u te
perfection. There will be frustra ting i rn p edimen ts on the tactical
level and civilian rules of criminal procedure will indeed d e ma n d
more from officials than do war-paradigm procedures. B u t as the
saying goes, we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the

good, especially as the legacy born of the first two weeks after 9 I 11
has proven far worse than the centuries-old, time-tested construct.
A d d i tionally, through domestic legislation we can ameliorate
some of the difficulties in countering twenty-first ce n t u ry terrorists
Rules of criminal
who do not qual ify for POW trea tme n t .
proced ure are designed to protect the underlying constitutional

righ ts They are prophylactic measures which can be modified. As
the Court recently explained in reference to warrant require1nents
for domestic surveil lance:
.

Given these potential disti.nctions between Title III criminal
surveilla nces and those involving the domestic security,
Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the
l a t te r which

differ from

those already

specified crimes in Title I l L
co mpa ti b le

with

the

Fourth

prescribed

for

Different standards may be
Amendment

i.f they are

reasonable both i n relation to the l egi t i m ate need of
Govern ment for i n te l l i ge nce i n fonnat i o n a n d the protected

rights of our citizens. For the warrant a p p l ication may vary
according to the governmental i nterest to be enforced and

the nature of citizen rights deserving pr otecti on. 1 09

would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether deliberately
or through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the
deprivation of life of the suspects without pu tting the lives of others at risk." fd.
109 U nited States v. United States Dist. Court 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972).
,
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There is no doubt that prosecuting terrorists can prove rnore

d i fficult than prosecuting normnl crim i n r d s .

Issues of evicle11Ce

collection, classified information, and c a l l ing witnesses from lhe
battlefield are da un ti ng

.

B u t they are far from i n s uxmountable.

fnstead of l Ll king on the whole systen1, it is far better to make

tailored adjustrncnts wherever possible, cl lh.i to renljze t h a t clarity
and

res tra

i n t c 1re s tTC'l teg i c goods themsel ves.
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